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Abstract: Th e phenomenon of artifi cial intelligence and robotics, which has been under investigation 
for several years, has given rise to new taxation models, which have opened a lively ethical and legal 
debate in the scientifi c and cultural community which has not yet subsided. Th is essay, analyzing the 
tax eff ects of the relationship between intelligent machines and humans in the light of the perspectives 
off ered by the new economy and aft er verifying compatibility with the founding principles of the Italian 
legal system (fi rst of all, the rule of ‘ability to pay’ pursuant to Article 53 of the Constitution), assesses 
new taxable cases and tax-levy techniques related to the applications of artifi cial intelligence, also in the 
light of the possible tax subjectivity of the robot, in an attempt to make a contribution, from a de iure 
condendo perspective, to the taxation dynamics concerning automated production processes.
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Introduction
In its current sense, the term ‘artifi cial intelligence’ (AI) refers to the use of 
sophisticated hardware and soft ware systems equipped with cognitive abilities typical 
of a human being – such as perception, rational reasoning, interpretation of external 
data, self-learning and decision-making autonomy – and able to plan certain actions 
and autonomously pursue defi ned purposes, within the limits predetermined by 
the programmer.1 Th e multiple methods of use, from a legal point of view, make the 
unitary analysis of the phenomenon complex: in some cases, automated systems and 
algorithms play an ancillary and serving role compared to traditional production 
structures; in others, however, they appear to be able to develop independently specifi c 
skills, including through self-learning and experience, taking on ‘anthropomorphic’ 
characteristics. Finally, there is no lack of intermediate systems which, while able to 
develop actions and relationships independently, do not always appear to be traceable 
to systematically tested models.2
As well as being the subject of investigation by experts of computer science, the 
spread of robotics and artifi cial intelligence – largely resulting from the development 
of technological knowledge and innovation – leads to a deep refl ection on the ethical,3 
1 F. Roccatagliata, Implicazioni fi scali legate allo sviluppo della tecnologia e alla gestione dei fl ussi 
di dati generati in via automatica, ‘Rivista della Guardia di Finanza’ 2019, no. 5, p. 1281; D. Canè, 
Intelligenza artifi ciale e sanzioni amministrative tributarie, (in:) S. Dorigo (ed.), Il ragionamento 
giuridico nell’era dell’intelligenza artifi ciale, Pisa 2020, p. 319.
2 A.  Uricchio, Robot tax: modelli di prelievo e prospettive di riforma, ‘Giurisprudenza italiana’ 
2019, no. 7, p. 1752; A. Uricchio, La fi scalità dell’intelligenza artifi ciale tra nuovi tributi e ulteriori 
incentivi, (in:) U. Ruff olo (ed.), Intelligenza artifi ciale. Il diritto, i diritti, l’etica, Milan 2020, pp. 
497–499.
3 L. Floridi, J. Cowls, M. Beltrametti, R. Chatila, P. Chazerand, V. Dignum, C. Luetge, R. Madelin, 
U. Pagallo, F. Rossi, B. Schafer, P. Valcke and E. Vayena, AI4People: An Ethical Framework for 
a Good AI Society. Opportunities, Risks, Principles and Recommendations, ‘Minds and Machines’ 
2018, no. 28, p. 689ff .; R. Cingolani and D. Andresciani, Robots, macchine intelligenti e sistemi 
autonomi: analisi della situazione e delle prospettive, (in:) G. Alpa (ed.), Diritto e intelligenza 
artifi ciale, Pisa 2020, p. 45ff .; L.  D’Avack, La Rivoluzione tecnologica e la nuova era digitale: 
problemi etici, (in:) U.  Ruff olo (ed.), Intelligenza artifi ciale, op. cit., p. 3ff .; P.  Moro, Macchine 
come noi: Natura e limiti della soggettività robotica, (in:) U. Ruff olo (ed.), Intelligenza artifi ciale, 
op. cit., p. 45ff ; U. Pagallo, Etica e diritto dell’Intelligenza Artifi ciale nella governance del digitale: 
il Middle-out-Approach, (in:) U. Ruff olo (ed.), Intelligenza artifi ciale, op. cit., p. 29ff ; G. Sartor and 
F. Lagioia, Le decisioni algoritmiche tra etica e diritto, (in:) U. Ruff olo (ed.), Intelligenza artifi ciale, 
op. cit., p. 81ff .; E. Grassi, Etica e intelligenza artifi ciale. Questioni aperte, Canterano 2020.
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economic4 and legal levels,5 and also in relation to tax matters,6 its having facilitated 
the exercise of economic activities and contributed to making signifi cant changes 
to the organization of work, domestic life, daily social relations and the models of 
production of goods and provision of services, allowing for further income and cost 
savings.7 Th e transformation of the processes of wealth production has also generated 
a new way of considering and perceiving the ‘real’ market, with evident repercussions 
in the economic and legal spheres, so as to make it no longer a simple physical 
place for the exchange of property rights, modulated on the interaction of supply 
and demand, but rather a boundless and liquid space in which to access, freely and 
without time restrictions, and to exchange any type of good (even digital ones), right 
4 J.  Rifk in, L’era dell’accesso. La rivoluzione della new economy, Milan 2001; A.  Giaume (ed.), 
Intelligenza artifi ciale. Dalla sperimentazione al vantaggio competitivo, Milan 2018; A. Mandelli, 
Intelligenza artifi ciale e marketing. Agenti invisibili, esperienza, valore e business, Milan 2018; 
F.  Pacilli, L’imprenditore del futuro. Come aumentare i profi tti, ridurre i costi e velocizzare 
l’amministrazione grazie al potere dell’Intelligenza Artifi ciale, Rome 2019; A.  Semoli, AI 
marketing. Capire l’intelligenza artifi ciale per coglierne le opportunità, Milan 2019.
5 B.G.  Buchanan and T.E.  Headrick, Some Speculations About Artifi cial Intelligence and Legal 
Reasoning, ‘Stanford Law Review’ 1970, no. 1, p. 40ff .; G.  Corasaniti, Intelligenza artifi ciale e 
diritto: il nuovo ruolo del giurista, (in:) U. Ruff olo (ed.), Intelligenza artifi ciale, op. cit., p. 395ff .; 
M. Costanza, L’AI: de iure condito e de iure condendo, (in:) U. Ruff olo (ed.), Intelligenza artifi ciale, 
op. cit., p. 407ff .; D. de Kerchove, Algoritmo, big data e sistema legale, (in:) A.F. Uricchio, G. Riccio 
and U. Ruff olo (eds.), Intelligenza Artifi ciale tra etica e diritti. Prime rifl essioni a seguito del libro 
bianco dell’Unione europea, Bari 2020, p. 73ff .; S.  Pietropaoli, Fine del diritto? L’intelligenza 
artifi ciale e il futuro del giurista, (in:) S. Dorigo (ed.), Il ragionamento giuridico, op. cit., Pisa 2020, 
p. 107ff .; G. Romano, Diritto, robotica e teoria dei giochi: rifl essioni su una sinergia, (in:) G. Alpa 
(ed.), Diritto e intelligenza artifi ciale, op. cit., p. 103ff .; R. Rovatti, Il processo di apprendimento 
algoritmico e le applicazioni nel settore legale, (in:) U.  Ruff olo (ed.), XXVI Lezioni di Diritto 
dell’Intelligenza Artifi ciale, Torino 2021, p. 31ff .
6 S. Dorigo, Intelligenza artifi ciale e norme antiabuso: il ruolo dei sistemi ‘intelligenti’ tra funzione 
amministrativa e attività giurisdizionale, ‘Rassegna tributaria’ 2019, no. 4, p. 728ff .; T. Rosembuj, 
Inteligencia artifi cial e impuesto, Barcelona 2019; L. Quarta, Impiego di sistemi IA da parte di 
amministrazioni fi nanziarie ed agenzie fi scali. Interesse erariale versus privacy, trasparenza, 
proporzionalità e diritto di difesa, (in:) A.F. Uricchio, G. Riccio, U. Ruff olo (eds.), Intelligenza 
Artifi ciale, op. cit., p. 250ff .; A. Di Pietro, Leva fi scale e divisione sociale del lavoro, (in:) U. Ruff olo 
(ed.), XXVI Lezioni, op. cit., p. 449ff .; V.  Mastroiacovo, Uguaglianza sostenibile e sostegno 
all’innovazione: quale tassazione dei sistemi di intelligenza artifi ciale?, (in:) V.V. Cuocci, F.P. Lops 
and C. Motti (eds.), La circolazione della ricchezza nell’era digitale, Pisa 2021, p. 63ff .; A. Uricchio, 
Prospettive per l’introduzione di nuovi modelli di prelievo in materia di intelligenza artifi ciale 
anche alla luce del recovery plan, (in:) U. Ruff olo (ed.), XXVI Lezioni, op. cit., p. 435ff .
7 S.A. Parente, Artifi cial Intelligences and ‘Robot Tax’: Th e Role of Robotics on Tax Structures and 
de iure condendo Perspectives, (in:) I. Florek, A. Koroncziová and J.L. Zamora Manzano (eds.), 
Crisis as a Challenge for Human Rights, Bratislava 2020, p. 353ff .
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to enjoyment – even if only temporary and shared (the so-called ‘sharing economy’)8 
– and information (which, in this context, become legally relevant entities)9.
In the current socio-economic structure, artifi cial intelligence and robotics 
both have the potential to rise to situations capable of generating manifestations of 
wealth attributable both to traditional categories (income, consumption, spending 
savings) as well as to completely new cases (the value of facilities deriving from the 
socialization of robotics).10
1. Th e New Economy and Tax-Levy Models
Whenever there is a new phenomenon, even if only in embryonic form, which 
can be abstractly confi gured as a centre for the imputation of rights and obligations, 
tax law is one of the most relevant sectors of legal knowledge to fathom its potential 
in order to verify its tax implications.11
An authoritative proposal, put forward by Bill Gates on 17 February 2017 during 
an interview with Quartz magazine,12 aims to subject robotics to the imposition of 
taxes through the provision of special collection tools, in order to allow a moderate 
transition to new production models and compensate for the lower revenue which 
results from the processes of the automation of work.13 In this light, it does not seem 
superfl uous to ask whether the term ‘work’, which is relevant from the tax point of 
view, should be limited to a traditional meaning,14 a human activity carried out 
8 On this topic, see M. Allena, Th e Web Tax and Taxation of the Sharing Economy: Challenges for 
Italy, ‘European Taxation’ 2017, no. 7, p. 1ff .; C. Buccico, Modelli fi scali per la sharing economy, 
(in:) D. Di Sabato and A. Lepore (eds.), Sharing economy. Profi li giuridici, Naples 2018, p. 161ff .; 
A.  Uricchio and W.  Spinapolice, La corsa ad ostacoli della web taxation, ‘Rassegna tributaria’ 
2018, no. 3, p. 483ff .; R. Schiavolin, La tassazione della sharing economy attuata con piattaforme 
digitali, ‘Rivista della Guardia di Finanza’ 2019, no. 5, p. 1259ff .
9 A.F. Uricchio, Manuale di diritto tributario, Bari 2020, pp. 29–30.
10 A. Uricchio, La fi scalità, op. cit., p. 489ff .
11 R. Cordeiro Guerra, L’intelligenza artifi ciale nel prisma del diritto tributario, (in:) S. Dorigo (ed.), 
Il ragionamento giuridico, op. cit., p. 87.
12 K.J. Delaney, Th e robot that takes your job should pay taxes, says Bill Gates, https://qz.com/911968/
bill-gates-the-robot-that-takes-your-job-should-pay-taxes/ (accessed 17.02.2017). For an initial 
discussion, see G.  Fransoni, Per la chiarezza delle idee su Bill Gates e la tassazione dei robot, 
‘Rivista di diritto tributario – supplemento online’ 10 March 2017, p. 1ff .
13 L. Summers, Robots are Wealth Creators and Taxing Th em is Illogical, ‘Financial Times’ 5 March 
2017; S. Dorigo, La tassa sui robot tra mito (tanto) e realtà (poca), ‘Corriere tributario’ 2018, no. 
30, p. 2364; F. Roccatagliata, Implicazioni fi scali, op. cit., pp. 1283–1284; A. Uricchio, Robot tax, 
op. cit., p. 1750; A. Uricchio, La fi scalità, op. cit., pp. 494–495.
14 M.  Persiani, Contratto di lavoro e organizzazione, Padua 1966, p. 5ff .; U.  Prosperetti, Lavoro 
(fenomeno giuridico), (in:) Enciclopedia del diritto, vol. 23, Milan 1973, p. 332ff .; G.  Suppiej, 
Il rapporto di lavoro: costituzione e svolgimento, Padua 1982, p. 96ff .; M. Grandi, Rapporto di 
lavoro, (in:) Enciclopedia del diritto, vol. 38, Milan 1990, p. 313ff .; C. Cester, G. Suppiej, Rapporto 
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through the use of physical and intellectual energy to gain an economic advantage 
and produce personal satisfaction, or rather if the activity rendered by intelligent 
robots can also be considered as work in a postmodern conception.15 According 
to a classical conception,16 work poses as a legal environment suitable for the 
production of taxable wealth only if it relates to human conduct; from a de iure 
condendo perspective, however, it would be desirable (albeit timidly, amid mistrust, 
scepticism –common to any new tax measure17 – and perplexity) to rethink and 
overhaul the traditional models of levy, enhancing the forms of wealth expressed 
by new technologies and diff erent types of artifi cial intelligence so as to subject the 
activities carried out by robots to taxation, based on the economic benefi ts enjoyed 
by the user.18
Th e preparation of tax measures aimed at targeting the forms of wealth created 
or manifested through the use of new technologies also appears essential in order to 
favour an overall rethinking of the tax models to be applied to the new economy and 
to guarantee an economic–fi nancial balance,19 which is elevated in the Italian legal 
system to a constitutional principle (Article 81 Paragraph 1 of the Constitution) with 
the changes made by constitutional law on 20 April 2012, no. 1.20
di lavoro, (in:) Digesto delle discipline privatistiche, sezione commerciale, vol. 12, Turin 1996, p. 
10ff .; P. Tosi, F. Lunardon, Subordinazione, (in:) Novissimo digesto italiano, vol. 15, Turin 1998, p. 
256ff .; M. Persiani, G. Prola, Contratto e rapporto di lavoro, Padua 2001, p. 3ff .
15 On this topic, see R. Del Punta, I diritti del lavoro nell’economia digitale, (in:) S. Dorigo (ed.), Il 
ragionamento giuridico, p. 99ff .
16 A. Uricchio, Il reddito dei lavori tra autonomia e dipendenza, Bari 2006, p. 47ff .; A.F. Uricchio, 
Percorsi di diritto tributario, Bari 2017, p. 157ff .; A.F. Uricchio, Manuale, op. cit., p. 199ff .
17 A. Uricchio, La fi scalità, op. cit., p. 503ff .
18 A. Uricchio, Robot tax, op. cit., p. 1754.
19 F. Bilancia, Note critiche sul c.d. ‘pareggio di bilancio’, ‘Rivista trimestrale di diritto tributario’ 
2012, no. 2, p. 350ff .; D. Cabras, Su alcuni rilievi critici al c.d. ‘pareggio di bilancio’, ‘Rivista AIC’ 
2012, no. 2, p. 1ff .; D. Morgante, La costituzionalizzazione del pareggio di bilancio, ‘Federalismi.
it’ 2012, no. 14, p. 1ff .; G. Rivosecchi, Il c.d. pareggio di bilancio tra Corte e Legislatore, anche 
nei suoi rifl essi sulle regioni: quando la paura prevale sulla ragione, ‘Rivista AIC’ 2012, no. 3, 
p. 1ff .; M. Bergo, Pareggio di bilancio ‘all’italiana’: Qualche rifl essione a margine della Legge 24 
dicembre 2012, n. 243 attuativa della riforma costituzionale più silenziosa degli ultimi tempi, 
‘Federalismi.it’ 2013, no. 6, p. 22ff .; G.M. Napolitano, I nuovi limiti all’autonomia fi nanziaria degli 
Enti territoriali alla luce del principio del pareggio di bilancio, ‘Rivista giuridica del Mezzogiorno’ 
2013, nos. 1–2, p. 91ff .; E. De Mita, Il confl itto tra capacità contributiva ed equilibrio fi nanziario 
dello Stato, ‘Rassegna tributaria’ 2016, no. 3, p. 563ff .
20 A. Uricchio, Robot tax, op. cit., p. 1753; A. Uricchio, La fi scalità, op. cit., pp. 501–512.
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2. Th e ‘Electronic Ability to Pay’ and Taxable Cases in the Automated 
Production Processes
Th e search for new taxable cases,21 compared to those traditionally subject 
to taxation, in addition to not being arbitrary, must express the eligibility of the 
obliged subject’s contribution according to economically appreciable situations, in 
compliance with the principles of reasonableness and fair distribution that derive 
from the tenet of the ability to pay and that make up the ethological humus at the 
basis of the Constitution of the Italian Republic.22 For tax liability purposes, in 
addition to ascertaining whether artifi cial intelligences, as machines equipped with 
cognitive skills similar to a human, have their own tax subjectivity, it is necessary to 
verify their compatibility with the principle of ability to pay,23 the foundation and 
limit of taxation and a guarantee for the taxpayer.24
From a distributive point of view, the tax burden – far from being limited 
only to indices (direct and indirect) that reveal wealth (such as income, assets and 
related increases, consumption or acts of exchange), from which can be deduced the 
suitability of the assumption to provide the tools with which to face the payment of 
the tax25 – can aff ect any fact with an economic content, not necessarily of a fi nancial 
nature, suitable for satisfying simple needs and interests or consisting of capacities, 
circumstances and events26, from which the subjective eligibility to assume the tax 
obligation is rationally deductible.27 Th is is the case of social position, i.e. the greater 
or lesser status of family well-being or education or the advantageous situation 
21 A. Giovannini, Quale capacità contributiva? ‘Diritto e pratica tributaria’ 2020, no. 3, p. 839ff .
22 A.F. Uricchio, Percorsi, op. cit., p. 41ff .; A. Uricchio, Robot tax, op. cit., p. 1758; A. Uricchio, La 
fi scalità, op. cit., pp. 513–514; A.F. Uricchio, Manuale, op. cit., pp. 50–51.
23 N. d’Amati, Diritto tributario. Teoria e critica, Turin 1985, p. 82.
24 A. Uricchio, Robot tax, op. cit., pp. 1758–1759; A. Uricchio, La fi scalità, op. cit., p. 515.
25 For a constrasting view, see G. Falsitta, Il doppio concetto di capacità contributiva, ‘Rivista di 
diritto tributario’ 2004, nos. 7–8/I, p. 889ff .; F. Moschetti, Il principio di capacità contributiva, 
espressione di un sistema di valori che informa il rapporto tra singolo e comunità, (in:) L. Perrone 
and C. Berliri (eds.), Diritto tributario e Corte costituzionale, Naples 2006, p. 44ff .; G. Gaff uri, Il 
senso della capacità contributiva, (in:) L. Perrone and C. Berliri (eds.), Diritto tributario, op. cit., p. 
31ff .; I. Manzoni and G. Vanz, Il diritto tributario. Profi li teorici e sistematici, Turin 2008, p. 30ff .; 
G. Gaff uri, Diritto tributario. Parte generale e speciale, Vicenza 2016, p. 32.
26 A. Fedele, Appunti dalle lezioni di diritto tributario, Turin 2005, p. 31ff .; A. Fedele, La funzione 
fi scale e la ‘capacità contributiva’ nella Costituzione italiana, (in:) L. Perrone and C. Berliri (eds.), 
Diritto tributario, op. cit., p. 1ff .; A. Fedele, Diritto tributario (principi), (in:) Enciclopedia del 
diritto, Annali, vol. 2, part 2, Milan 2009, p. 447ff .; F. Gallo, Le ragioni del fi sco. Etica e giustizia 
della tassazione, Bologna 2011, p. 78ff .; F. Gallo, L’evoluzione del sistema tributario e il principio 
di capacità contributiva, (in:) L. Salvini and G. Melis (eds.), L’evoluzione del sistema fi scale e il 
principio di capacità contributiva, Padua 2014, p. 3ff .; A. Fedele, Ancora sulla nozione di capacità 
contributiva nella costituzione italiana e sui ‘limiti’ costituzionali all’imposizione, (in:) L. Salvini 
and G. Melis (eds.), L’evoluzione, op. cit., p. 13ff .
27 A. Uricchio, La fi scalità, op. cit., p. 513.
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enjoyed by the originator of a negative externality compared to a similar activity 
without the aforementioned impact. Th is also admits to the owners of goods or 
activities that the taxation of their income, assets or consumption is unsatisfactory in 
relation to the advantageous situation connected to this ownership.28
So that the tax subjectivity of intelligent robots is recognized, it is necessary to 
identify an ability to pay – for them – that can be subject to taxation (a so-called 
‘electronic ability to pay’)29 autonomously and unitarily appreciable. From a de iure 
condendo perspective, depending on how the tax legislator intends to defi ne the 
taxable case, the ability to pay could (in the abstract) be identifi ed by the asset value 
of the robot, by the production of the income deriving from the activity carried out 
by the same (and, therefore, in the greater production capacity deriving from the use 
of robotics and automated processes)30 or in the cost savings achieved through its 
use.31
However, it would not be possible to make the simple existence of the robot 
relate to a wealth index to legitimize the provision of an ‘electronic capitation’ or 
a ‘possession tax’: taxes of this kind could prove unfair if applied in an equal and 
generalized manner for all robots without taking into account their value, the time of 
use, their eff ective production capacity and, therefore, the utility resulting from their 
use.32
3. Fiscal Policies and Robot Tax: De Iure Condendo Perspectives and 
Critical Issues of the Models
From an equalization point of view, the robot tax, as a form of levy imposed on 
automated production processes, can take on diff erent confi gurations, depending on 
the tax policy choices made by the individual legal system: on the one hand, it could 
substantiate itself in the denial of tax concessions on investments aimed at automating 
production or relating to economic operators who make a large part of their profi ts 
using robotic tools or technological innovation processes; on the other hand, it could 
consist in the preparation of a real tax applied to the ‘robotic person’, on the basis of 
the ‘normal value’ of the activity performed (rectius, fi ctitious remuneration obtained 
following comparison with human work), as an entity deemed to have autonomous 
28 R. Cordeiro Guerra, L’intelligenza artifi ciale, op. cit., pp. 92–93.
29 X.  Oberson, Taxer les robots? L’émergence d’une capacité contributive électronique, ‘Pratique 
juridique actuelle’ 2017, no. 2, p. 232ff . 
30 S. Dorigo, La tassa sui robot, op. cit., p. 2369.
31 A.F. Uricchio, Manuale, op. cit., p. 61ff .
32 A. Uricchio, Robot tax, op. cit., p. 1760; A. Uricchio, La fi scalità, op. cit., pp. 518–519.
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legal subjectivity33 (a so-called ‘electronic personality’)34 and learning capacity (so-
called ‘machine learning’), and able to perform functions and carry out actions 
previously reserved only to human beings.35
In reality, both of the proposed solutions raise critical issues: the fi rst variant, 
in the absence of uniform supranational regulation, would not be fully eff ective, as 
economic operators could easily escape a disincentivizing tax regime by delocalizing 
production to jurisdictions which, in order to attract capital and taxable matter, are 
free of such obstacles.36 Th e second model, undoubtedly striking, appears entirely 
theoretical at the moment, as it is not certain that technological developments can, at 
least in the short term, create a ‘thinking’ machine equipped with its own decision-
making autonomy and tax subjectivity, even in problems of a dogmatic nature which 
pertain both to the subjective profi le (lacking a shared notion of ‘robot’ and a level of 
autonomy such as to allow a separate consideration from human beings) and to the 
objective side (since it is not easy to identify the elements capable of justifying the 
robot’s contribution to public expenses, due to the absence of a salary to which to 
parameterize the ability to pay).37
33 X. Oberson, Taxing Robots? From the Emergence of an Electronic Ability to Pay to a Tax on Robots 
or the Use of Robots, ‘World Tax Journal’ May 2017, p. 247; F. Caroccia, Soggettività giuridica 
dei robot? (in:) G. Alpa (ed.), Diritto e intelligenza artifi ciale, op. cit., p. 213ff .; A. Berti Suman, 
Intelligenza artifi ciale e soggettività giuridica: quali diritti (e doveri) dei robot? (in:) G. Alpa (ed.), 
Diritto e intelligenza artifi ciale, op. cit., p. 251ff .; P. Moro, Alle frontiere della soggettività: indizi di 
responsabilità delle macchine intelligenti, (in:) U. Ruff olo (ed.), XXVI Lezioni, op. cit., p. 55ff .
34 European Parliament Resolution of 16 February 2017 concerning recommendations to the 
Commission on civil law rules on robotics, 2015/2103/(INL), § 59(f), https://eur-lex.europa.
eu/legal-content/IT/ALL/?uri= CELEX%3A52017IP0051 (accessed 16.09.2020); U.  Ruff olo, 
Intelligenza artifi ciale, machine learning e responsabilità da algoritmo, ‘Giurisprudenza italiana’ 
2019, no. 7, p. 1702ff .; G. Teubner, Soggetti giuridici digitali? Sullo status privatistico degli agenti 
soft ware autonomi, ed. P. Femia, Naples 2019, p. 29; U. Ruff olo, La ‘personalità elettronica’, (in:) 
U. Ruff olo (ed.), Intelligenza artifi ciale, op. cit., Milan 2020, p. 213ff .; U. Ruff olo, Responsabilità da 
algoritmo e ‘personalità elettronica’, (in:) A.F. Uricchio, G. Riccio and U. Ruff olo (eds.), Intelligenza 
Artifi ciale, op. cit., p. 365ff .; U.  Ruff olo, La personalità elettronica tra ‘doveri’ e ‘diritti’ della 
machina, (in:) U. Ruff olo (ed.), XXVI Lezioni, op. cit., p. 115ff . For criticism, see A. Drigo, Sistemi 
emergenti di Intelligenza Artifi ciale e personalità giuridica: un contributo interdisciplinare alla 
tematica, (in:) S. Dorigo (ed.), Il ragionamento giuridico, op. cit., p. 195.
35 S. Dorigo, La tassa sui robot, op. cit., p. 2367.
36 J. Walker, Robot Tax: A Summary of Arguments ‘For’ and ‘Against’, https://emerj.com/ai-sector-
overviews/robot-tax-summary-arguments/ (accessed 24.10.2017).
37 S. Dorigo, La tassa sui robot, op. cit., p. 2367; T. Falcão, Should My Dishwasher Pay a Robot Tax? 
‘Tax Notes International’ 2018, p. 1273ff .
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4. Th e Attribution of Asset Relations to Intelligent Machines: Th e 
‘Digital Peculium’ and ‘Robot Companies’
Th e prospect of a future attribution of asset relations to intelligent machines 
is, moreover, the subject of lively debate: a positive solution could be endorsed by 
recalling and adapting the Romanistic institution of the peculium38 – an object of 
multiple uses as a separate asset of the master managed independently by the slave, 
a simple instrumentum vocale39 devoid of any form of legal subjectivity – which 
sought to outline the mechanisms of relative and contingent subjectivization of what 
was certainly not a juridically relevant subject for the law then in force.40 Th e ‘digital 
peculium’ would make it possible to create a separation of assets – aimed at protecting 
the multiple interests involved – without the need to recall a full legal personality.41
On closer inspection, in the current phase, subjecting artifi cial intelligences to 
taxation is not the same as considering robots as taxable persons, since tax liability 
is limited to community members only, as they are the locus of the attribution of 
rights and duties of a political and tax-related nature. Although in the near future the 
inclusion of robots among the members of the community and the recognition that 
they have an electronic ability to pay,42 limited to their ownership of assets or taxable 
wages (as hypothesized in a famous collection of science-fi ction short stories written 
by Isaac Asimov),43 cannot be excluded, it is certain that these conditions are not 
yet current, as the self-determination of automata appears premature.44 In this light, 
a robot tax could become a toll on companies with a higher level of automation or 
with less use of human labour (so-called ‘robot companies’), hitting the excess profi ts 
achieved thanks to the use of innovative technologies.45
38 N. Wiener, Th e Human Use of Human Beings. Cybernetics and Society, Boston 1950; G. Taddei 
Elmi, I diritti dell’intelligenza artifi ciale tra soggettività e valore: fantadiritto o ius condendum? 
(in:) L.  Lombardi Vallauri (ed.), Il meritevole di tutela, Milan 1990, p. 685ff .; L.E.  Wein, Th e 
Responsibility of Intelligent Artifacts: Toward an Automation Jurisprudence, ‘Harvard Journal 
of Law & Technology’ 1992, no. 6, p. 103ff .; U. Pagallo, Th e Laws of Robots. Crimes, Contracts 
and Torts, Cham 2013, p. 102ff .; M.  Rizzuti, Il peculium del robot. Spunti sul problema della 
soggettivizzazione dell’intelligenza artifi ciale, (in:) S. Dorigo (ed.), Il ragionamento giuridico, op. 
cit., p. 284.
39 F.  Bianchini, A.M.  Gliozzo and M.  Matteuzzi, Instrumentum vocale: intelligenza artifi ciale e 
linguaggio, Bologna 2008; E. Stolfi , La soggettività commerciale dello schiavo nel mondo antico, 
‘Teoria e storia del diritto privato’ 2009, no. 2, p. 1ff .; D. Di Sabato, Gli smart contracts: robot che 
gestiscono il rischio contrattuale, ‘Contratto e impresa’ 2017, no. 2, p. 389.
40 R. Cordeiro Guerra, L’intelligenza artifi ciale, op. cit., pp. 91–92; M. Rizzuti, Il peculium del robot, 
op. cit., p. 286.
41 A. Drigo, Sistemi emergenti, op. cit., p. 196.
42 X. Oberson, Taxing Robots? op. cit., p. 250.
43 I. Asimov, Io, robot, Milan 1950.
44 R. Cordeiro Guerra, L’intelligenza artifi ciale, op. cit., p. 91.
45 G. Fransoni, Per la chiarezza delle idee, op. cit., pp. 1–2.
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At the most, due to the limits that, at present, do not allow the recognition of 
a tax subjectivity for intelligent machines, a solution to legitimize their taxation 
could be to elaborate the concept of the ‘digital personality of the robot’, taking up the 
proposals on the taxation of the digital economy which, in the matter of permanent 
establishment, refer to the existence of a ‘signifi cant digital presence’: in this way, the 
robots would be subject to a levy not as autonomous taxable persons but as permanent 
establishments (with separate taxation) of their master and benefi cial owner.46
5. Robot Tax, Strengthened Ability to Pay and Presumptive Forms of 
Taxation
From a postmodern processing perspective, there is no shortage of further 
alternatives that could be feasible in the abstract: on the one hand, the possibility of 
parameterising a robot tax to an index of ‘strengthened ability to pay’, consisting of 
the economic advantage – equal to the greater potential to generate revenues or cost 
savings (such as lower costs incurred for the replacement of employees) – consequent 
to the activity carried out by intelligent machines in a given tax period or relative 
to the utilities received, taxed on the basis of the normal value (with the provision 
of specifi c corrective measures) and aimed at preventing the double taxation of 
the company’s profi ts and the economic benefi ts achieved by the robots used to 
carry out the production activity. On the other hand is the possibility of the use of 
presumptive taxation models, applied reasonably and based on the estimate of the 
benefi ts associated with the use of robots, also through an increase in the rates of 
direct taxes imposed on those who make use of the robotic workforce due to their 
greater capacity to produce profi ts.
Especially at fi rst, it could be simpler to foresee an experimental tax on the asset 
of intelligent robots, diff erentiated according to their capacity for accumulating data 
and knowledge, and imposed on the user; this tax, insisting on a diff erent assumption 
from that for income taxes, as well as allowing for greater revenue, would be easily 
ascertainable, being the presence of a robot which is traceable and recognizable.47
In reality, beyond the transitory experimentation, some solutions could lead to 
empirical or reductive results in the long term, as they relate the levy to the higher 
profi t achieved through the use of automated procedures (so-called ‘extra profi ts’) or 
diff erentiate it based on the robot’s learning ability; even making use of presumptive 
tax models would not always allow the quantifi cation of exactly the contribution 
provided by the artifi cial intelligences.48 Furthermore, subjecting the greater profi ts 
46 F. Roccatagliata, Implicazioni fi scali, op. cit., p. 1285ff .; A. Uricchio, La fi scalità, op. cit., p. 506, 
n. 48.
47 A. Uricchio, Robot tax, op. cit., pp. 1760–1761; A. Uricchio, La fi scalità, op. cit., p. 521.
48 S. Dorigo, La tassa sui robot, op. cit., pp. 2367–2368.
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made by companies whose production system is based on automation to taxation 
with ordinary income taxes cannot always grasp the advantages that the availability 
of this form of organization of production brings to its owner in a satisfactory way.49 
From a de iure condendo perspective, there is the possibility of confi guring the robot 
tax without excessively altering the structure of the existing tax system; using the tax 
instrument to compensate for the social damage caused by technological innovation, 
in order to take into account negative externalities, correlates to the automation of 
production processes in terms of employment and the fi nancing of public spending.50
Conclusion
In this light, and taking up Pigouvian theory,51 the taxation of robotics, 
even in the absence of certain scientifi c evidence, would aff ect the production 
of technological companies due to the negative external eff ects resulting from the 
adoption of automated procedures, since these are activities that pursue worthy 
objectives of economic growth, but with respect to which it is necessary to manage 
and internalize any negative collateral consequences so as to protect the community 
– in order to restore fi nancial equilibrium through compensation for lower income, 
related to the reduction of human labour52 – and the individuals aff ected by the loss 
of employment through the preparation of policies aimed at supporting the costs of 
training and retraining human personnel.
Substituting the negative externality to be compensated for with taxation of 
the decline in employment, the tax base could be parameterized to the reduction 
of the human workforce induced by the automation of production processes and, 
therefore, to the cost savings achieved by the economic operator, who no longer has 
to pay a salary to employees.53 In this way, with regard to the distribution profi le of 
the tax burden, the revenue that can be obtained from a robot tax would allow the 
imbalances produced by innovative policies within the labour market to be faced on 
the basis of a further refl ection: the eff ects of automation require public intervention, 
as they cannot be remedied alone by the market’s ‘invisible hand’.54
49 R. Cordeiro Guerra, L’intelligenza artifi ciale, op. cit., p. 93.
50 S. Dorigo, La tassa sui robot, op. cit., pp. 2367–2368; R. Cordeiro Guerra, L’intelligenza artifi ciale, 
op. cit., p. 90, n. 8, p. 92.
51 A.C. Pigou, Economia del benessere, Turin 1960.
52 F. Roccatagliata, Implicazioni fi scali, op. cit., p. 1286.
53 S. Dorigo, La tassa sui robot, op. cit., pp. 2368–2369.
54 G. Fransoni, Per la chiarezza delle idee, op. cit., p. 2; S. Dorigo, La tassa sui robot, op. cit., p. 2369; 
F. Gallo, Il futuro non è un vicolo cieco. Lo stato tra globalizzazione, decentramento ed economia 
digitale, Palermo 2019, p. 30ff .
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A hybrid solution seems to be the one advanced in the Italian legal system 
(Article 1 of the law proposal C. 4621,55 presented to the Chamber of Deputies on 3 
August 2017 and not implemented), which, in order to discourage the replacement of 
the human workforce with robotics and to induce corporate companies to reconvert 
production processes, equipping workers with the knowledge and skills to guarantee 
them a place in a constantly evolving labour market,56 has proposed a 1-percentage-
point increase in the corporate tax rate in the event that ‘the production activity of 
the company is carried out and managed mainly by artifi cial intelligence and robotics 
systems’, unless the taxpayer provides investment of a sum equal to 0.5% of its 
revenues in professional retraining projects for its employees, or in corporate welfare 
instruments, in the related tax period.
Th e experimentation with tax tools applied to the innovations brought by 
robotics off ers multiple solutions that the tax legislator is called to examine with 
particular caution;57 however, the evaluation of the levy models used to assess 
artifi cial intelligence requires shared choices in the international context or, at least, 
in the European Union,58 as recently reiterated in the European Commission’s White 
Paper on Artifi cial Intelligence,59 in order to avoid market distortions that could 
damage free-competition rules and prevent further reasons for the delocalization of 
production and wealth.
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